national Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) at Ibadan, Nigeria, in 1967, and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT) in Cali, Colombia, in 1968 .
The further development of IARCs took place largely under the auspices of the CGIAR. The CGIAR is an informal organization providing oversight to a system of international research centers, a mechanism for collectively funding those centers, and a forum to discuss and affirm overall research-policy objectives. 4 Table 12 .1 provides a chronology of major CGIAR systemwide activities. Developments regarding the CG (now also known as Future Harvest) centers themselves are briefly chronicled in the section that follows.
The Centers of the CGIAR, 1971-2005
The institutional development of the CG centers involved three main phases (Table 12. 2). 5 In the first period, the four founding centers developed independently. The second phase took place in the decade that followed the formal establishment of the CGIAR in 1971. At that time, the CGIAR was relatively narrowly focused on what was perceived to be the main problem in developing countries: food deficits. The original mission statement read:
To support research and technology that can potentially increase food production in food-deficit countries of the world. The research activities supported by the CGIAR are appropriately focused on food commodities which are widely consumed and collectively represent the majority of the food sources of the developing world and no major changes or additions are called for at this time. (CGIAR 1977, p. iv) Norman Borlaug, Nobel laureate and founding director of CIMMYT's wheat program, reiterated this food-focused goal for the CGIAR in 1982:
The mandates of the IARCs call for them to orient their research, training and technical assistance activities toward increasing the absolute availability of world food supplies, with particular emphasis on food production in the developing world. IARC research activities are to concentrate on those critical aspects of food production in the developing world that are not being adequately addressed elsewhere, which offer potential of widespread benefits of food security, either regionally or globally, and which address the problems of producers in low-income, food-deficit countries. (1982, p. 66) 6 In keeping with this broad objective, seven centers were added that dealt with different issues, including different commodities, farming systems (agroecologies in particular), and livestock diseases. These included the International Potato Center (CIP), the West Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA), the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), the International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases (ILRAD), the International Livestock Center for Africa (ILCA), the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI, previously IBPGR), and the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA). In addition, two social science centers-IFPRI and the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR), which was closed in 2004 and now constitutes a division within IFPRI-were created and incorporated. 7 This expanded group of 13 centers constituted the CGIAR throughout the 1980s. The system grew, and each center grew with it. Changes took place in the context of the most rapid growth of total spending experienced by the system, and a relatively simple and well-understood purpose. A culture developed in which research resources seemed abundant. At the same time, pressures were developing to extend the research agenda and place more emphasis on environmental sustainability, nutrition, income distribution, and poverty. Consequently, in the mid1980s, the emphasis shifted. A new goals statement for the system was adopted in 1986, defined by the CGIAR's Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) Secretariat as follows:
Through international agricultural research and related activities, to contribute to increasing sustainable food production in developing countries in such a way that the nutritional and general economic well-being of low-income people are improved. (TAC 1987, p. 219) The third phase of the evolution of the CG system was instituted in 1990. At that time the establishment was extended to include five more centers, several of which had existed for a decade or more as independent operations. 8 The new CG centers included the World Agroforestry Centre (previously ICRAF), the International Water Management Institute (IWMI, previously IIMI), the WorldFish Center (previously ICLARM), the International Network for Improvement of Banana and Plantain (INIBAP, now closed as a stand-alone center and reconstituted as a networking organization incorporated into IPGRI), and the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). Thus the mandate of the system was extended to include agroforestry, aquaculture, irrigation, and forestry. In the beginning of 1995, ILCA and ILRAD were merged to form the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), perhaps signaling the beginning of a fourth phase in the history of the CGIAR: an era of consolidation and contraction, as the organization was forced to economize in the face of resource constraints and slower growth. Notwithstanding the increasing fiscal constraints on the system, the next version of the CG mission statement-proposed by the third external review panel (CGIAR System Review Secretariat 1998, p. 11 ) and adopted at the October 1998 annual meeting-reaffirmed a broad agenda for the CG, which after minor subsequent revision read:
To contribute to food security and poverty eradication in developing countries through research, partnerships, capacity building, and policy support, promoting sustainable agricultural development based on the environmentally sound management of natural resources. (CGIAR 2003a) The latest version of the CG's mission statement is more outcome-oriented but still encompasses the broad agenda introduced in the 1990s. It now reads: To achieve sustainable food security and reduce poverty in developing countries through scientific research and research-related activities in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, policy, and environment. (CGIAR Science Council 2005b) The essential story is one of mission creep, a broadening of the agenda-in line with the same trends in agricultural research agendas in rich-country NARSsbut without a commensurate increase in the amount of funding. In addition, in parallel with these developments, as described below, the cost of doing business rose, along with institutional complexity and the costs of seeking and allocating resources.
Funding Patterns of the CGIAR
While the CG system has captured the attention of the international agricultural R&D and aid communities through its scientific achievements and its pivotal role in the Green Revolution, it has spent only a small fraction of the global agricultural R&D investment. In 1995, the CG represented 1.5 percent of the nearly $22 billion (in 1993 prices) global public-sector investment in agricultural R&D and 1.0 percent of all public and private spending. Data on the evolution of CGIAR spending and the distribution of funds among the various centers are included in Appendix Table 12A .1. The data in the table represent expenditures from all funding sources in inflation-adjusted (1999 U.S. dollar) values. Figure 12 .1 plots the nominal and real (that is, adjusted for inflation) values of total expenditures for the CGIAR.
The Evolution of Total Funding
The CG system began modestly. Between 1960 and 1964 , of the institutes that would become the CG, only IRRI was operating as such. After an initial expenditure of $7.4 million in 1960, total spending rose to $1.3 million per year in 1965. 9 By 1970, the four founding centers-IRRI, CIMMYT, IITA, and CIAT-were allocated a total of $14.8 million annually. The progressive expansion of the number of centers, and the funding per center, during the next decade involved a 10-fold increase in nominal spending, to $141 million in 1980. During the 1980s, spending continued to grow, more than doubling in nominal terms to reach $305 million in 1990. The rate of growth had slowed but was still impressive. In the 1990s, however, although the number of centers grew-from 13 to 18 before contracting to the current 15-funding did not grow enough to maintain the level of spending per center, let alone sustain the growth rates. Since 2000, total funding has grown, but with a continuing trend toward support earmarked for specific projects and programs of research involving multiple centers and research providers outside the CG. Figure 12 .1 shows trends in the distribution of total CG system funding to the founding four centers, the nine added in the 1970s, and the 1990s expansion centers. In the early years of plenty, all the centers grew together, but they did not grow at the same rate. Funding allocated to the four founding centers has declined significantly. In 1971, these centers accounted for 100 percent of the allocation. By 1980, their share had slipped to 54 percent, and by 2004 it was down to 36 percent. During the stagnation of the 1990s, nine centers experienced a nominal decline in support, including the four original centers, CIP, ICRISAT, ILRI, ICARDA, and ISNAR. The centers being downgraded tended to be the larger centers. Among the pre-1990 centers, IPGRI grew the fastest, with its funding more 450  200  350  250  400  100  150  50  0 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Real expenditures than doubling in just five years. Of the new entrants, the two forestry institutes showed the greatest gains. These broad trends indicate that, through both the addition of new centers and the allocation of funds among centers, the agenda of the CG shifted dramatically away from its original focus, especially in the 1990s. Stagnant total CG spending has been accompanied by a shift in spending away from conducting research-intramurally or jointly with others-toward other activities. These other activities include hosting and managing research networks that facilitate research performed by others, some in conjunction with CG centers (Plucknett, Smith, and Özgediz 1990) ; rehabilitating seed stocks in war-ravaged countries like Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Cambodia; promoting zero-till systems in the wheat systems of the Indo-Ganges Plains; and developing smallholder milksupply systems in Africa. Some of these initiatives entail technology-transfer activities that complement CG research; others involve a move into development efforts less directly related to research.
Changing Donor Roles
Over time, the number of donors has grown, and the pattern of support they provide has changed (Table 12. 3). The U.S. government and U.S.-based foundations originally contributed two-thirds of the total. The support from foundations has declined steadily. The support from the U.S. government declined precipitously and relatively recently, especially in the mid-1990s (with some small reversal of this trend since 2000). Support from the Canadian government followed suit (although Canada doubled its previous year's contribution in 2003 and increased funding by another 60 percent in 2004). Taken together, in real terms the support from Canada and the United States in 2001 was equivalent to what they gave in 1977; and, even with the recent recovery, their combined funding in 2004 was still only 80 percent of that sustained during most of the 1980s and early 1990s. This North American withdrawal during the 1990s-a crucial event in the recent history of the CG-was offset to some degree by a substantial increase in Japanese support during that period. Japan's support has faltered in the past few years, however, as that country's economy has stalled, and it dropped by half in 2002.
In the beginning (using 1972 figures), the private foundations provided 49 percent of the total funding. European nations as a group provided 15 percent; the United States 18 percent; and the World Bank 6 percent. The picture is now very different. If the private foundations intended to provide seed money and eventually be displaced, they were successful. Their funding support has fallen in nominal terms and now constitutes less than 3 percent of the total. In 2004, European nations as a group (including multilateral support through the European Commission) provided $181 million, or 41.4 percent of the total. In the same year the World Donors have played an increasing role in influencing the allocation of the funds. Of course, donors should have some influence, but they are not the only stakeholders, and it cannot be assumed that donor interests necessarily coincide with systemwide objectives. Part of the CGIAR challenge is that its donors have specific objectives related to the geopolitical relevance of and distribution of benefits from its research. 11 In the CG's early years, virtually all its funding came in the form of unrestricted support (wherein the funds were earmarked by center, and spending within a center was largely at the discretion of that center's management). This remained the dominant mode of funding for the CGIAR throughout the 1970s. Typically, new centers were fully funded with unrestricted support, and unrestricted funding for existing centers remained a significant share of their revenues throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. For example, in 1982 unrestricted funds as a share of the CG total averaged 84 percent, about 82 percent for the four founding centers and 87 percent for the newer centers.
After 1983, unrestricted funds declined steadily, to 44.5 percent of the total in 2003. This decline has two distinct phases. From 1983 to 1987, the unrestricted share fell, but total funding for the CG (in real, inflation-adjusted terms) continued to rise. For the period thereafter, both real funding and the unrestricted share declined, partly reflecting the fact that most of the new centers admitted to the CG in the 1990s joined with comparatively small amounts of unrestricted support (unlike those that joined during the 1970s). The corollary to the decline in the share of unrestricted funding is a rise in the share of funds earmarked for specific purposes.
The World Bank Role
The World Bank has played a pivotal role in many aspects of the CG that in some respects has gone beyond its role as a co-sponsor. 12 The chairman of the CG is chosen by the president of the World Bank, the CG's System Office (formerly the CG Secretariat) is located in the World Bank, many of the operational and staff costs incurred by the System Office are paid for by the Bank, and the Bank has provided a good deal of funding for the CG centers. 13 The Bank's support to the System Office and other noncenter activities such as systemwide reviews and CG committee work has averaged more than $6 million per year for the past five years. The Bank has also contributed funds as a donor. Its contribution rose from $1.26 million in 1972, to $45 million by 1997, jumping to $50.1 million in 1994 in response to a financial crisis in the system; it has remained at that level for all but two years since. Bank funding as a percentage of total CG center spending has increased for much of the CG history, from an average of 7.6 percent from 1972 through 1975 to 11.8 percent in 2004 (peaking at 15.4 percent in 1995) .
The form, as well as the amount, of World Bank funding is of some consequence. From the inception of the CG until 1993, the Bank played the role of "donor of last resort." Through its review and endorsement of annual budget proposals for centers, the Consultative Group decided the desired overall pattern of funding for the system (or funding for the agreed agenda, in CG parlance), but individual donors remained free to make their final allocations to specific centers or specific projects within or across centers. Historically, the CG Secretariat played an active role in negotiating with donors to allocate core support across the system; nonetheless, funding for some centers fell short of the amounts deemed desirable. In all such cases the CG Secretariat would, as a matter of course, use Bank funds to fill in the funding gap, up to a limit of 25 percent of a center's approved program budget (with total Bank funding not to exceed 15 percent of the overall CG approved program). 14 Thus, centers that routinely secured less than their approved budget were insulated from these structural funding realities by the actions of the Bank. Although the Bank's funding practices maintained overall system priorities, the Bank had little chance to exercise its own funding preferences. From 1988 through the 1990s, the Bank was underwriting a growing share of the budgets of many centers (and a growing share of the CG's total budget). By 1992, every center sought Bank support. These CG developments (combined with internal pressures from within the Bank) prompted the Bank to exercise more discretion over the disbursement of funds from the late 1990s. 15 The increasing tendency for the World Bank to earmark its support for particular areas of research (rather than leave decisions about allocation of funds to the discretion of the centers) was most evident after 2001. In 2003, only $15.95 million (or 37.1 percent of the agency's direct support to the centers) was in the form of general or core support, compared with $37.7 million (94.7 percent) in 2002. The remaining World Bank funds were directed toward global public goods research (39.5 percent), Systemwide Initiatives (4.1 percent), Challenge Programs (discussed in more detail below) (16.0 percent), and special allocations (3.3 percent).
The Broader Policy Context of Changes in the CGIAR
The decrease in support for the CG system in recent years may be better understood in the context of more general changes in development aid, global trends in public and private agricultural science investments, and other changes in national agricultural-research systems in less-developed countries, as well as some specific discussion of past CG research and its likely effects in the future.
Agricultural R&D as an Element of Development Aid
Since 1960, total official development assistance (ODA) from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, including both multilateral and bilateral assistance, grew in real terms to a peak of $71.1 billion (1999 prices) in 1992, dropping to $50.2 billion by 2001 (and increasing thereafter to $64.2 billion in 2003). There was no clear shift over time in the bilateral share of total ODA assistance: during the 1990s bilateral aid fluctuated around an average of 70 percent of total aid (Table 12.4) .
Data on the sectoral orientation of aid are available for bilateral but not multilateral funds. In contemporary times, the agricultural component of bilateral assistance grew steadily, to peak at $4.9 billion in 1988, and declined to $2.1 billion in 2003. The data suggest a strong shift away from agriculture in aid-funding priorities. Agriculture's share of all bilateral aid fell from 15.2 percent in 1988 to 4.2 percent in 2003. The CG received a minuscule share of both total ODA (0.55 percent in 2003) and bilateral ODA (0.76 percent). However, from the 1970s to the mid-1980s, funding for the CGIAR grew more rapidly than overall ODA, so the share of CG funding in total ODA grew (to a peak of 0.76 percent in 1984). Since then, CG funding has moved more or less in line with total ODA, with the CG share fluctuating around an average of 0.58 percent in the 1990s and early 2000s. The CG share of total bilateral aid has followed a similar trend. In contrast, funding for international agricultural R&D as a share of bilateral aid to agriculture grew from 4.2 percent in 1973 to 18.1 percent in 2001.
The pattern of aid funding and the CG share of that funding from the United States-historically the largest country donor to the CG-is worthy of note. Total ODA from the United States grew, albeit erratically, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, falling precipitously during the first half of the 1990s (from $13.4 billion, in 1999 prices, in 1992 to $7.1 billion in 1997) but recovering to $15.2 billion in 2003. U.S. bilateral aid followed the same general pattern. The agriculture component of U.S. bilateral aid peaked in 1980 (at $1.01 billion, or 24.7 percent of total bilateral aid), but, in keeping with global trends, U.S. aid priorities shifted away from agriculture thereafter (agricultural bilateral aid was only $0.2 billion in 2003, 1.4 percent of total U.S. bilateral aid). The U.S. component of CG funding grew (in inflation-adjusted terms) during the 1970s and, also, though at an ever-slower rate, during the 1980s and early 1990s. It declined markedly from 1993 to 2001, increased significantly in 2002, and held steady thereafter. This trend was similar to that in the United States component of CG funding expressed as a share of bilateral U.S. aid to agriculture: that is, an increasing share of U.S. agricultural aid was directed to agricultural R&D from 1971 to 1992; this trend was strongly reversed from 1992 to 1995 but resumed thereafter (except in 2000). However, this general shift in U.S. agricultural aid priorities toward CG research was insufficient to offset the precipitous decline in overall and bilateral U.S. aid (through the early 2000s), and the result was a sharp decline in the U.S. contributions to the CG. Moreover, the very substantial shift of U.S. aid priorities away from agriculture, which first became noticeable in the early 1980s, meant that U.S. funding to the CG accounted for an ever-smaller share of total U.S. aid since then, despite CG research's commanding a larger share of U.S. aid to agriculture for most of these years.
Global Agricultural Science Policy
Today's external political, economic, and scientific environments are markedly different from those that gave rise to the CGIAR. In the late 1960s, the prospects of mass starvation throughout Asia and elsewhere had been averted, but the threat still loomed large in the minds of many policymakers. 16 National agricultural research systems throughout much of the developing world (especially Africa, Central America, and parts of Asia) were grossly underfunded, understaffed, and unprepared to lift agriculture by means of R&D-induced productivity growth. In the mid-1970s, agricultural research intensities (measuring investments in agricultural R&D as a percentage of agricultural gross domestic product) in the developing world averaged only 0.44 percent, compared with 1.53 percent among rich countries (Pardey and Beintema 2001) . Most strikingly, between 1965 and 1970 , all countries throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia and Pacific region (including China), and Latin America combined spent less on publicly performed agricultural R&D than the United States alone (Pardey, Roseboom, and Anderson 1991) .
The CG was seen as an effective way of pooling resources to address the underinvestment problem and to locate research institutions throughout the developing world to redress the paucity of local research capacity. With comparatively few developing-country scientists trained to international caliber, most of the scientists staffing the CG centers were drawn from developed-country (often U.S.) universities. The invisible colleges that came with these staff served to stimulate the flow of knowledge from the first to the third world while providing the technical know-how to adapt and develop new technologies for developing-country (largely tropical) agriculture.
The rapid growth of the CG expenditures throughout the 1970s and early 1980s paralleled the growth in national research spending, especially in developing countries. Thereafter, the rate of growth of spending on agricultural research slowed in most countries, and in some countries spending even shrank (Pardey and Beintema 2001) . CG spending has followed the same pattern, reflecting the slowdown in development aid spending (the source of most CG funds), among other factors.
In recent years, priorities for public agricultural research have also changed dramatically. The public research agenda has broadened. Public R&D fundingespecially in the rich countries that account for nearly 90 percent of the CG's funding-has shifted toward research on postharvest handling, food processing and food safety, and environmental issues such as soil erosion and groundwater pollution; emphasis has shifted away from production agriculture. These adjustments reflect the increasing influence of nontraditional interest groups-environmentalists, food processors, and consumer lobbies-in the formulation of agricultural science policy, as well as the expanded research role of the private sector (Alston, Pardey, and Taylor 2001) . In addition, some governments have pushed public funds toward more basic research, the benefits from which are more difficult for the private sector to appropriate, and away from applied research of more immediate consequence for industry (Alston, Pardey, and Smith 1999) .
Donor funds directed toward both international and national agricultural R&D agencies (especially those in Africa) have reflected first-world concerns with the environment and agricultural aspects beyond the farm. Dalrymple (2004) and Gardner and Lesser (2003) have recently restated and reemphasized the "global" publicgood rationale that spurred international collective action to fund agricultural R&D over three decades ago. Notwithstanding the fundamentally unchanged nature of these global public goods, donors increasingly seem to view agricultural R&D as a means of directly and rapidly tackling poverty problems rather than as an activity best suited to stimulating productivity and growth over the longer term, with poverty reduction brought about as a consequence of that growth. 17 The organization and management of agricultural R&D has also been changing. The private sector is paying for and conducting an ever-larger share of agricultural research. In the developed countries, as many previously public roles have been privatized and university and other publicly performed research activities are becoming increasingly proprietary, the lines between private and public research are becoming blurred (Nottenburg, Pardey, and Wright 2002; Boettiger et al. 2004) . Private R&D firms have increasingly been able to bid for publicly funded projects, some public research and technology transfer institutions have been explicitly privatized, and others (such as universities) have received a mandate to sell their research services to private firms. In addition, public agricultural-research facilities are being phased out in many countries, and management and employment structures have been altered (Alston, Pardey, and Smith 1999) . These changes include the introduction and expansion of contestable funding arrangements among alternative, often public, research agencies (including the increased use of competitive grant processes); a shift away from long-term contracts toward shorter, fixed-term contracts for researchers; and expanded accountability and oversight procedures.
Similar changes have taken place in some developing countries as well, although the timing and specifics of the changes are different, and the private sector has generally played a smaller role as both a funder and performer of R&D (see the country case studies in this volume). Some countries (especially in Africa but also in Asia and Latin America) have seen a contraction in real public support for agricultural R&D. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, some of this reduction in domestic support was partly offset by an increase in donor funding for research, but in more recent years overall donor funding has declined, and spending priorities have shifted away from agriculture and agricultural R&D.
Intellectual Property Rights and Related Issues
The pace and focus of biological innovation in agriculture and related industries, who pays for R&D and how much, and the costs and benefits of the research all depend on the form of property protection afforded the results of specific R&D projects. Many countries are enacting or revising laws to protect biological material and the innovations and research processes surrounding that material. These national efforts are increasingly being shaped and circumscribed by international laws and conventions (Boettiger et al. 2004 ). These changes in property protection appear to be changing the roles of the public and private sectors with regard to the funding, performance, and dissemination of agricultural R&D, but because much else is changing too, the specific effects of changing property rights are not clear. Moreover, many of the practical implications of these property-rights policies remain unresolved, which makes it difficult to be definitive about their ultimate impact on the nature and rate of technical progress in agriculture.
Rapidly changing policy environments have resulted in some complicated problems for the operation and management of public (nonprofit) institutions such as the CGIAR (Nottenburg, Pardey, and Wright 2002) . Advances in biotechnology that have been greatly reinforced by evolving intellectual property rights for agricultural research have increased the role of the private sector in research activities that used to be the exclusive domain of the public sector. Research outputs are being privatized, with stronger intellectual property rights protection. The traditional paradigm of the one-way flow of research output from public agencies to the private sector no longer holds (if, indeed, it ever did), and the acquisition of proprietary technologies from the private sector is an important consideration for the management of public institutions. Similarly, plant genetic resources, which were once considered a "common heritage of mankind," are increasingly subject to intellectual property protection through international agreements and national legislation (Binenbaum et al. 2003; Koo, Nottenburg, and Pardey 2004) . Consequently, the intellectual property aspects of the germplasm held in CGIAR genebanks (and related information) pose major policy problems. Manifestations of these problems include concerns over biopiracy and arrangements for sharing benefits among those supplying and using new crop varieties, such as the provisions of the International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources that came into force in June 2004.
The current trends in intellectual property protection may jeopardize the traditional role of the CG system, which has been based on the principle of free exchange of technologies and genetic materials. The centers face a new challenge: how to afford to give away germplasm while having to negotiate use rights for private-sector proprietary technologies with limited financial resources. Privatesector partners with the CG may insist on exclusive access arrangements to make it worth their while to invest substantially in development and marketingcontradicting the principle of open access. Unless the CG centers find ways to cope with these new circumstances, the effectiveness of international public institutions in benefiting the poor could be greatly diminished.
The CG system, like other agricultural research systems, appears to have seen a marked growth in administrative overhead in the past 20 years or so. Since a much higher proportion of funding is now received as project-or program-specific grants, rather than unrestricted funding, the role of overhead is perhaps more transparent than it once was, but it is also more important, as the system has become more top-heavy and bureaucratic and is beginning to deal with the growing complexities of intellectual property.
Funding mechanisms have evolved along with the CG system. In the early days, the funds were provided essentially unencumbered to centers, with minimal donor intervention. Over time, the system of funding has evolved to a much more elaborate and expensive process of donor-center bargaining over funding and activities-sometimes involving bilateral deals with donors, but increasingly involving multilateral arrangements with other CG centers, other research providers, and often several donor agencies in a consortium arrangement (Binenbaum and Pardey 2005) . Thus rent-seeking by centers and the vested interest of donors have assumed greater importance, and the costs of negotiation and competition for funds have become ever greater. Compared with the original, albeit much smaller, CG system, the current setup involves much greater transactions costs and rent-seeking costs. At the same time, the quality of information in the system is probably lower and achieved at a greater cost, and there is reason to believe that resource-misallocation costs have risen.
Another issue that has relevance beyond the CG system is the (evolving) nature of the relationship between the international research system (and individual centers within that system) and other private and public agencies engaged in related scientific activity. Changes in international intellectual property regimes and modern biotechnology have added to the reasons for paying attention to these relationships (Binenbaum, Pardey, and Wright 2001) . The nature of the relationship between an individual center and the national research system of the country in which it is located, and between that system and the research systems in other countries, influences the degree to which the center's work is redundant, synergistic, or complementary to the activities of others. An important question is, what is the comparative advantage of the CG system? In other words, if the CG system is designed to address international market failure, where is that failure most severe? It is there that the payoff for CG activities will be greatest.
Management and Allocation of Resources
Knowledge of the objectives and purpose of a research institution is critical for evaluating its achievements, setting priorities, and managing resources efficiently and effectively. The essential economic rationale for government involvement in science is market failure, in the sense that, left to itself, the private sector would do too little research, make the wrong mix of research investments from society's perspective, and charge the wrong price for the outputs from science. The arguments are particularly relevant in agriculture (for example, see Chapter 2 of this volume), and similar issues arise in considering international involvement and cooperation in agricultural R&D.
In modern economic parlance, the main problem is spillovers. Research results developed in one country (or part of a country) can be adapted and adopted elsewhere, often at little cost. Intellectual property rights provide inadequate protection for many types of agricultural technologies, even within a country. In addition, there is a market failure problem among nations that parallels the market failure among firms within nations. Each individual nation has diminished (inadequate) incentives to take action to rectify the global market failure in agricultural R&D. This is the prima facie case for international collective action in agricultural research. Alston (2002) provides a more extended discussion of these issues and summarizes empirical evidence on the importance of interstate and international agricultural research spillovers.
Spillovers lead to interconnected problems of appropriability and attribution, and thus in the assessment of returns to agricultural research (see Alston and Pardey et al. 2004) . A further set of difficulties arises when the goals of the investment are complex or unclear. Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) argued that research evaluators would do well to focus on a single objective-maximum net benefits-since multiple objectives require the specification of tradeoffs of net benefits, often against multiple, other, hard-to-measure objectives, and publicsector research is unlikely to be the best instrument for pursuing many objectives other than those associated with a market failure in research. 18 Even with a simple, single objective, evaluation is difficult.
Objectives of the CGIAR
The objectives of the CGIAR have always had a welfare or distributional element; they have not been focused simply on efficiency. Multiple goals are typical of public research agencies, even in rich countries. However, while motivated by a desire to alleviate poverty-as manifested most tangibly in hunger and mass starvationthe earlier incarnations of the CG system were much more clearly and narrowly focused on varietal (and associated crop-management) improvement for cereal grain and certain staple root crops. The more recent shifts toward adding environmental sustainability, improved nutrition, and poverty alleviation as explicit goals make the management and evaluation of the effort much more difficult. Consensus on the interpretation and achievement of such goals is elusive.
Perhaps more important is the fact that the CG system has been largely supported by the aid programs of the developed-country donors, not as a part of their agricultural science policy. 19 For instance, the USDA is the primary agency for U.S. agricultural R&D, but USAID is the primary agency for representing the United States in the CG system. Aid agencies cannot be expected to have the same perspective on science policy as science agencies; they are likely to pay much more attention to humanitarian and geopolitical objectives.
In addition to these complications, the "CG objective" has become more ephemeral with the rising importance of individual donors in determining the allocation of research resources. Donors may have primarily humanitarian reasons for being involved, but the nature of their involvement often reflects interests closer to home: for example, the Japanese government has taken particular interest in IRRI rice research. The U.S. and Australian governments have taken particular interest in CIMMYT wheat research-and these nations have numbered among the significant beneficiaries of the research they have supported.
Strategic Decisionmaking Processes
Strategic decisions within the CGIAR (including systemwide governance structures, the choice, location, and strategic orientation of the centers to include in the system, annual system and center-specific funding targets and strategies, and some scientific and key operational principles and practices) are made through a consultative, consensus-building process. This structure dates back to the early 1970s, when there were only four CG centers. At that time, just four donors accounted for 69 percent of the total CG funds; two of those donors (the Ford and Rockefeller foundations) had been instrumental in establishing research programs based on lessdeveloped countries (LDCs) and precursor centers to the CG, and the main members of the Group were also well represented on the boards of each center. 20 Thus funding agencies, CG center boards, and other governance units within the CG had a focused and shared vision and a shared sense of how to achieve that vision. Hence, the costs of consultation were small.
As the size and scope of the CG grew (in terms of total funding, the number of members, and the number, location, and mandates of the CG centers), and the formal activities spread well beyond research (to include training, institutional development within LDCs, and science policy leadership), so too did the costs of consultation. To the annual general meeting (held in Washington, D.C., in October or November, and known as International Centers Week) a midterm meeting was added in 1979 (generally hosted by a developing country and held in May), and meetings of various standing, oversight, and partnership committees.
The growth in the scale and scope of the formal CG meetings provides a good indication of the growing costs of consultation. The first meeting of the CGIAR in 1971 had 58 participants, all of whom represented financial donors from the North (CGIAR System Review Secretariat 1998, p. 106). In 1987, International Centers Week (ICW) had 230 participants; by 1997 this number had grown to 480 and involved CG and non-CG center staff plus 54 member delegations. CG center delegations averaged 7.6 persons in 1997 (compared with 5.8 in 1987), noncenter delegations averaged 4.9 persons (2.2 in 1987), and member delegations averaged 2.6 (2.2 in 1987). Moreover, Centers Week grew to span two weeks, with numerous, generally back-to-back meetings in the week prior to ICW proper. Likewise, the midterm meeting grew from 155 participants in 1987 to 240 in 1997. Since 2000, efforts have been made to streamline CG decisionmaking processes. The last of the midterm meetings was held in May 2001, at which time the ICW was also scaled down to a one-week annual general meeting. Some of the CG's decisionmaking authority was devolved from the members at large to an executive council (although this council still seems unwieldy, with 22 members in 2003). 21 Özgediz (1995) details the substantial work that has been done at the system level to evaluate CG research and provide information to TAC (one of the system's pivotal standing committees, now reconstituted as the Science Council), to donors, and to others that aid in setting priorities for R&D. 22 The amount and type of formal analysis used in this process is highly variable and to a large degree has reflected the proclivities of the TAC (now Science Council) chair. Little in the way of data or methods has carried over from one reporting cycle to the next. Thus, despite this long history of priority setting within the CG, it has yet to develop and maintain any systematic databases or analytical capacity designed to support priority-setting processes at the systemwide level. 23 The CG has undergone three system reviews, in 1977, 1981, and 1998 . 24 These reviews have made little use of formal evaluation techniques or quantitative analysis, and they have been expensive: the direct cost to the CG of the second review was around $450,000, and the 1988 review is thought to have cost about $1.5 million. The CG also undertook an impact study at the system level, carried out for a cost of $1.1 million between 1984 and 1986, which generated 24 CG study papers, a synthesis report in 1987, and several summary reports in 1988. 25 While providing a useful and reasonably comprehensive historical and contemporary account of CG activities, these studies were largely descriptive in nature. They stopped short of placing an economic value on the activities being evaluated. TAC has also prepared a series of reports (initially released at three-year intervals, later on a five-year cycle) on overall system priorities and strategies. 26 The latest of these systemwide priority-setting exercises was a structured, but nonetheless largely consultative, multi-objective process that was tabled in December 2005 (CGIAR Science Council 2005a). The CG also has applied numerous review, assessment, and accountability procedures at the subsystem level, including more than 70 external management and program reviews of individual centers. These reviews are costly, and it is unclear what effect they have had on the conduct and performance of the centers in the light of the other significant and growing influences on each center's activities, notably the shift to project-based funding and the commensurate reduction in unrestricted funding. 27 In addition, many centers engage in their own processes of periodic, internally commissioned external reviews, often involving in-depth peer review of the specifics of a center's planned or ongoing research. These various review requirements sometime require a substantial amount of quantitative research evaluation work within individual CG centers. Probably the most important and best-developed work along these lines is from CIMMYT. Scientists there have developed a global database on the resources that NARSs commit to wheat-breeding research and on the adoption of modern wheat varieties (including those developed at CIMMYT or based on CIMMYT-bred parental lines), and have undertaken a number of complementary adoption-cum-impact studies of specific aspects of CIMMYT work in various countries. Some of this more formal evaluation work has been used in setting research priorities within each center, but much has been motivated by a desire to shore up funding support.
Changing Use of Funds
Changes in the structure of the CG, the environment in which it operates, and its own modus operandi have had important implications for the efficiency with which resources are used, as well as for the total amount of funds available. The pervasive increase in external accountability demands placed by donors (and others) on the centers and the system, and the proliferation of more-specific reporting and review requirements associated with the shift to project funding mechanisms, have placed considerable additional transactions costs on the CG. These costs are difficult to document, but they include the costs of time spent by center management and, increasingly, scientists in preparing, revising, and submitting project proposals, as well as time spent briefing donors and preparing interim and final donor reports. In many cases the external reviews that donors require of special projects are also paid for with project funds. 28 Even less visible, but nonetheless a rapidly increasing feature of much project funding, are the limitations on how project funding may be spent, including requirements to collaborate with or earmark project funds for donor-country institutions or scientists, irrespective of their advantages relative to other possible collaborators. All of these constraints directly affect research efficiencies and can add greatly to the cost of conducting research.
Several factors contributed to changes in actual (and changes in what would have been efficient) discretion over the allocation of CG funding. Certainly the longer-run trend toward more-restricted (mainly project-based, but increasingly programmatic) funding shifted resource-allocation decisions away from TAC, CG center directors, and CG scientists (arguably those best qualified to evaluate scientific opportunities and probabilities of research success) and toward individual (as distinct from collective) donor preferences. Indeed, the increased tendency of donors to earmark research funds to specific, well-defined research projects can be seen as cherry-picking among those centers, and research capacities within centers, that best align with the policy and, perhaps, commercial, interests of individual donors. However, a number of other factors were also influencing resource-allocation decisions and the configuration of the research itself. One was the changing (probably increasing) economies of scale and scope of R&D and reductions in some of the cost involved in longer-distance, multi-agency collaboration (as a result, for example, of easier travel and better information technologies). These economies might suggest less, not more, center-bound, programmatic research; although the rising transactions costs of conceiving, negotiating, and implementing multicenter collaborations would limit the efficient size of this type of R&D.
The shift from so-called unrestricted (or core) to more-restricted sources of support induced various institutional initiatives on the part of the CG centers. One such response was the formation of cross-center programs of research, intended to attract new funding sources to the CG, to revive the flagging interest among existing CG members, to shift the locus of decisionmaking closer to those most knowledgeable about scientific opportunities, to refocus CG research on longer-term research of broader global (or at least regional) significance, and also to respond to the fundamental economic forces pushing for an agglomeration of effort among CG centers. One manifestation of these institutional responses was the multi-center systemwide and ecoregional initiatives that were launched in the early 1990s. More recently, beginning around 2001, a series of time-bound, independently governed programs of research, dubbed Challenge Programs, were conceived. Three such programs (Water and Food, HarvestPlus, and Generation CP) were moving from their inception to operational phases by 2003.
Some evaluation and accountability is probably good (as is some engagement with donors), but, to achieve the potential benefits, assessment must contribute to setting research priorities and improving research efficiencies. The CG's costly review and reporting efforts have not provided sufficient substantive information to improve resource-allocation procedures. Relative to the early years, a much larger fraction of the total resources is spent on bureaucratic processes, rent-seeking within the system, and securing funds, leaving a smaller share to spend on research. In addition, the allocation of the residual funds among types of research has changed, with a much smaller share now going to the original CG agenda.
Changing Orientation of Research
In the early years, the CGIAR's focus was narrow. In the early 1970s, productivity improvement accounted for an estimated 74 percent of total CG spending, and rice, maize, and wheat together accounted for half of the total. Since then, the focus has broadened beyond staple grains and beyond productivity. With the addition of other centers dealing with other issues, it was natural that the share of CG research on staple grains should decline. The share of resources going to cereals (wheat, rice, maize, millet, barley, and sorghum) fell from 56 percent in the early 1970s to 37 percent in 2002. Similarly, research on the larger aggregate of crops (including roots and tubers, legumes, and bananas and plantains) declined in importance from 86 percent in the period 1972-76 to 71 percent in 2002. Livestock research has always constituted a much smaller share of the total than crops. Its share rose during the 1970s, remained around 20 percent during the 1980s, and fell to about 13 percent by 2002 (roughly the same share as when the CG was established).
By construction, these estimates allocate all CG expenditures to certain commodity areas, whether they involve basic, applied, adaptive R&D, or nonresearch activities. Another important perspective on CG spending is the share of R&D devoted directly to productivity-enhancing versus environmental or other resourcemanagement (including "biodiversity") and policy-cum-institutional aspects. 29 The CG estimates that expenditures designed to enhance agricultural productivity declined from 74 percent of the total in the period 1972-76 to 34 percent in 2002, with the balance that year going to "strengthening NARSs" (23 percent) "protecting the environment" (18 percent), "improving polices" (15 percent), and "saving biodiversity" (10 percent) (CGIAR Science Council 2003b, p. 4) . 30 Of course, some of these CG activities (involving an increasing amount of nonresearch activities, euphemistically dubbed "institutional strengthening") will be expressed eventually in crop and livestock production. But some of the change reflects the expanded mandates, including movements into social sciences, and more recent figures (after 1992) show a shift toward aquaculture and forestry.
The Payoff: Impacts of the CGIAR On the face of it, CG spending appears to have been a very effective investment. The difficulty lies in determining the CG's true share of the achievements that many attribute entirely to the CG. How much could have been achieved without the interaction with the NARSs and previous work elsewhere? Partitioning results among institutions playing complementary or synergistic roles in science is problematic. The challenge is to determine the relevant counterfactual scenario: what would the world have been like if the CG had not existed and had not played the roles it has?
Nature of the Outputs
The CG system is a small part of the global effort in agricultural R&D, but within a relatively well-defined arena it is an important, if not the dominant, player. In developing fundamental genetic material to support the production of cereals and other crops in LDCs, the role of the CG has been central. The CG system provides materials that are adopted and adapted by NARSs. For instance, in 1986-90, Byerlee and Moya (1993) claimed that over 85 percent of wheat varieties released in LDCs were CIMMYT-derived, so that 70 percent of total wheat area in these countries was sown to CIMMYT-based germplasm in 1990. They also estimated that 43 percent of the total area planted to wheat in Australia, New Zealand, Italy (durum), South Africa, the United States, and western Canada was planted to germplasm with CIMMYT ancestry. In addition, improved rice varieties (many with CG elements in their pedigrees) were harvested on 74 percent of developingcountry fields in 1991 (Byerlee 1994) . In addition to their dominant role in developing wheat and rice varieties, for developed and less-developed countries alike, CG centers have played significant roles in developing genetic material for other crops (Evenson and Gollin 2003) . And, apart from developing new varieties, the CG has collected and conserved a sizable share of the world's agricultural germplasm .
Genetic improvement of crops is only part of the picture. The CG system also has invested significantly in, and contributed to, the development and adaptation of improved agronomic and farming practices for LDCs. Livestock research has contributed to animal production and animal health-work that was until recently Africa-based but is now global. As well as providing information and technology for use by NARSs, the CG has helped improve the NARSs themselves through training and human capital development. These efforts have included the institutional work of ISNAR and the food-policy work of IFPRI. More recently the CG has contributed to a broader range of areas, including fish and forestry products, and placed more emphasis on environmental and resource issues. This shift represents a move away from the historical strength of the CG-developing productivityenhancing technology that is widely applicable, with perhaps some modification to fit local conditions-to the pursuit of more site-specific results, with a range of objectives other than productivity.
Economic Evaluations of Agricultural Research in the CGIAR
A variety of studies have looked at various aspects of the research programs of the CG centers, including several formal research evaluation studies. Much of this work has been conducted within the CG system, looking at individual centers or programs, or systemwide, but some has been conducted by external agencies.
Economic approaches to research evaluation typically involve computing the streams of benefits implied by a simulation of what productivity, prices, and quantities produced and consumed might have been under a different pattern of research investments. Then the streams of changes in research benefits are compared with the associated streams of changes in research costs, using conventional capitalbudgeting methods. The results are typically summarized as internal rates of return (the discount rate for future benefits and costs that equates the discounted present value of benefits to the present value of costs) or as benefit-cost ratios (the ratio of the discounted present value of benefits to the present value of costs). Public-sector agricultural research is regarded as a good investment if the computed rate of return exceeds the required rate of return for public investments (typically a real rate of less than 5 percent per annum), or if the benefit-cost ratio is greater than one.
In their statistical meta-analysis of these estimated rates of return, Alston et al. (2000a and b) explored the possible influence of differences among characteristics of the rate-of-return measure (for example, real versus nominal, and social versus private), the analyst (for example, self-evaluation versus external evaluation), the research (for example, crops versus livestock, developing-versus developed-country, basic versus applied), and the evaluation itself (for example, ex ante versus ex post, econometric or not, and type of lag structures used). In general the signal-to-noise ratio was low, so that it was hard to distinguish some of the effects, but others were statistically significant. There was no evidence that rates of return declined over time, or that the rate of return to environmentally oriented research would be as good as that to traditional areas of agricultural science, such as plant-variety improvement. Table 12 .5 summarizes the rate-of-return evidence for research carried out by the international agricultural research centers (IARCs). 31 A total of 62 observations-only 3.4 percent of the reported estimates in the meta-analysis-refer to IARC research. The average rate of return is 78 percent per annum, slightly higher than (but not statistically different from) the 73 percent average across all studies. All of the IARC evidence relates to crop research, with average rates of return for research on rice, potato, and wheat research identified in Table 12 .5. The rates of return to other types of crop research conducted by the IARCs, is, on average, twice the average for rice research. However, reported rates of return range widely around the averages. The 142.3 percent average rate of return to other crop research is largely the consequence of one outlier observation that reports a rate of return of 1,490 percent per annum; deleting this outlier from the sample reduces the average rate of return to 30 percent per annum. Of the 62 IARC estimates, 6 (10 percent) of the estimates related to yield-enhancing research (compared with 42.5 percent of all the estimates); 18 (about 29 percent) related to crop-management research, and 30 estimates (48 percent) related to various other types of research.
Doing Well by Doing Good
Studies of the multicountry impacts of varietal-improvement research done in international centers have shown that a large share of the benefits accrues to the donor countries, a situation that Tribe (1991) referred to as "doing well by doing good."
Beginning with John Brennan's work on the impacts in Australia of wheat varieties from the international wheat and maize research center CIMMYT (Brennan 1986 (Brennan , 1989 , a number of studies have attempted to value the benefits to particular countries from research conducted at CG centers, in some cases comparing them against donor support provided by the countries in question. 32 In the first such study, Brennan (1986 Brennan ( , 1989 reported that for the period 1973-84, Australia gained US$747 million in the form of cost savings to wheat producers as a result of having adopted CIMMYT-based wheat varieties. (He noted that Australia's annual contribution to CIMMYT was about US$340,000, while the average expenditure on wheat breeding in Australia had been about US$4-5 million per year.) On the basis of genetic parentage, he attributed two-thirds of the cost savings to CIMMYT per se, with the remaining one-third attributable to the inputs of Australian wheat breeders who used CIMMYT releases as parental lines. Pardey et al. (1996) found that, depending on the genetic attribution rule used, the U.S. economy gained at least US$3.4 billion and up to US$14.6 billion between 1970 and 1993 from the use of improved wheat varieties developed by CIMMYT. In the same 23-year period, they found that the U.S. economy realized at least US$30 million and up to US$1 billion through the use of rice varieties developed by IRRI. These are large benefits relative to the U.S. support of CIMMYT and IRRI (US$131 million in present-value terms up to 1993), or even the total budget of the entire CGIAR system (around US$200-300 million per year in the 1980s and 1990s, but much less than that during the 1970s). They are likely to overstate the net U.S. benefits from IARC varieties in that they do not reflect price impacts. 33 For instance, Alston (2002) suggested that the effect of CIMMYT wheat varieties driving down the price of wheat would reduce the U.S. benefits from CIMMYT wheat varieties by $300-600 million in 2000 alone.
Criticisms of the CGIAR and the Green Revolution, and Some Responses
Although no one denies the significant contributions of the CGIAR to the Green Revolution, clearly some people are harmed by any large changes in technology, and the Green Revolution is surely no exception. 34 For instance, those farmers who cannot adopt the technology, but have to compete for resources and markets with those who do, are clearly worse off. So are those consumers who might not benefit from lower food prices but who experience lower water quality as a consequence of agricultural intensification.
Critics of the CG attach heavy weight to the negative aspects of agricultural innovations. Some of these critics have gone so far as to question the entire CG enterprise in the light of their perceptions of harm to the environment or to certain individuals or groups. Some of the criticisms are false, reflecting a misunderstanding of the facts or of the relevant counterfactual alternative, or an ideological position reflecting a bias against change. Others may be factually correct but overblown, owing to a lack of perspective: some negative impacts may be very large yet still be dwarfed by the enormous positive impacts that accompanied them. But some may be valid.
Recurring criticisms of the Green Revolution are that the technologies
• were inherently biased toward large farmers;
• were destructive of the environment, encompassing land degradation, air pollution, loss of water quality owing to salinization and runoff, and loss of natural habitats;
• replaced "natural" inputs and practices with "artificial" (less "organic" farming);
• encouraged globalization;
• increased farmers' dependency on manufactured inputs from the North;
• made production riskier and more vulnerable to climate and pests;
• increased the financial risks faced by farmers;
• displaced labor from agriculture;
• increased inequality;
• lacked a pro-poor focus, or at least outcome;
• worsened absolute poverty;
• bypassed farmers in poor or less-favored areas; and
• reduced biodiversity.
In short, it is claimed that CG technologies promoted unsustainable, highinput agricultural practices that may have raised crop yields but did so at the expense of the long-term economic and environmental sustainability of the agricultural system. In addition, genetic resource conservation and use practices of the CGIAR are said to have promoted the denigration of the biological base used in agriculture and led to biopiracy.
Most of these criticisms are not new, and many of them would apply with equal force to the application of modern agricultural technologies in rich countries as well. Clearly there have been some environmental and human-health consequences of the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, irrigation, and mechanization. Agricultural economists are guilty of having failed to quantify some of these effects, but it is also true that the effects are hard to quantify, and no one really knows what the physical impacts have been, let alone what they are worth. 35 Considering the conventional measures of private benefits and costs, which capture the main effects, however, the story is much clearer. Both farmers and consumers in less-developed countries have benefited enormously from the Green Revolution, and most assessors have judged that the benefits are to be measured on a different scale from the costs.
An appropriate assessment requires a clear understanding of what would have happened otherwise. In other words, what is the relevant counterfactual alternative? It certainly would not have been an option to preserve the conditions of the 1960s indefinitely. Many of the negative trends associated with the adoption of Green Revolution technologies would have been similar or worse without them. Would farmers seeking to survive using the old technologies have spared the environment? Would they have cleared more or less rain forest? Would they have farmed more or less intensively on fragile environments? What new technologies would have been developed instead? In many cases the answer is unclear or may be unfavorable to the critics of the Green Revolution.
A balanced consideration of the issues needs to account for all the effects that are quantitatively important. And it is also appropriate to take a broader perspective and incorporate other policies, recognizing that agricultural R&D policy is not the ideal instrument for pursuing social objectives other than economic efficiency and growth . In other words, it is perhaps the deficiencies of other policies that are to blame for some of the negative consequences of Green Revolution technologies, and not the CGIAR for having helped to make those technologies possible. Clearly it is important to take these criticisms seriously and debunk those that are without foundation; but it is also important to take action to address those that have merit-either through the revision of research priorities or, better, through the introduction of complementary policies to address the unwelcome side effects of otherwise beneficial technologies.
A misunderstanding of these arguments is reflected in the changing policies within the CGIAR over the past 30 years, and that misunderstanding has led to the broadening of the agenda and the incorporation of a wider range of interests and perspectives into CG decisionmaking processes. As noted above, the result has been negative consequences for the productivity of the system and, in turn, we suspect, for the resources being made available to it.
Conclusion
The rationale for government intervention in the private provision of agricultural R&D is market failure: individuals will underinvest, hoping to catch a free ride on the efforts of others. In an international context, countries play the roles of individuals to some extent (see Chapter 2). Any one country may underinvest in R&D if the results can be adopted and applied elsewhere so that the researcher will capture only a fraction of the benefits from investing in invention. In relation to R&D applicable to LDCs, both domestic and international market failures of these types have led to a large, persistent gap between the socially desirable rates of investment in agricultural R&D and actual investments.
The efficiency rationale for the CG system is to overcome, or at least to mitigate, the underinvestment problem. The humanitarian rationale is to help the foodpoor. The CG as it exists today combines elements of these two rationales, with the effects of some self-serving motives of certain donors adding further complications. In order to be effective in achieving any of these objectives, the CG, given its rela-tively small resource base, should focus on the areas in which the market failures are greatest and where it has an advantage over public and private research in the NARSs.
In its first three decades, the CG system made its mark. Its primary focus was on cereal crops following the objectives of the preexisting centers. Even today, many of the more demonstrable results of the CG system are those identified most clearly with the first four centers. With the dramatic expansion of the CG, funding per center grew initially, but recently competition among centers for funds became more pronounced. CGIAR's total funding has become more uncertain in a number of ways. And of that total, a greater proportion is now provided in the less secure, and less flexible, form of restricted or project funding. Like the U.S. agricultural R&D system, the CG system is becoming more subject to earmarking by those who fund it. In addition, with expansion of the number of centers and the broadening mandate, the management of the CG system has progressively become more complex, top-heavy, administratively burdensome, and expensive, notwithstanding some recent attempts to streamline operations.
With the rise in the number of centers, the mandates of the system have changed, and the emphasis has shifted away from crop productivity toward objectives that have also risen in prominence in the national agricultural research systems of richer countries, emphasizing things such as sustainability, nutrition, and equitable income distribution at the expense of productivity. The comparative advantage of the CG does not appear to have been a criterion in recent decisionmaking. This situation may have been a consequence of the apparent abundance of research resources, which may have led to a perception that there was no opportunity cost to accommodating the newer political agendas in the system. This perception was clearly wrong. Similar patterns have been apparent in the agricultural R&D systems of the world more generally, perhaps for similar reasons. The consequence has been a reduction in the resources available for the more-traditional productivity-enhancing investments.
The CGIAR was brought into existence because of a perceived threat to world food supplies, and to build on the successful performance of IRRI and CIMMYT. Its purpose was to create additional, similar centers, mobilize funds for them, and provide a structure that would determine broad priorities, monitor performance, and allocate total funding in accordance with priorities and performance. Its early success was considerable, and the system (or parts thereof ) remains a highly successful enterprise today, although some features of its evolution can be seen as undesirable. The key innovation of the CGIAR system was the development of IARCs, operating independently, governed by an independent board, and located in the ecology and social environment being served. There was great confidence in the ability of science to address the food-production problems of developing countries, and this confidence was justified quickly. The food research being undertaken required relatively little capital investment, so that the creation of new institutions was relatively cheap.
Over time, the CGIAR has misplaced its original, well-defined sense of purpose and to some extent has degraded its capacity to meet its original-and still relevant-objective: to stave off hunger by enhancing the capacity of the world's poor people to feed themselves, through research-induced improvements in agricultural productivity. This failure is in part an inevitable consequence of an important institutional attribute of the system: to be an element of international development efforts to reduce poverty, rather than a mechanism for providing multinational agricultural R&D investments as an international public good. The fundamental and main purpose and outcome are similar, but the priorities and effectiveness are different when the culture is one of providing welfare assistance rather than promoting economic efficiency. Moreover, over time, the priorities of the CGIAR have shifted in the same direction as the rich-country agendas for agricultural R&D-that is, toward "luxury" goods such as safer, higher-quality food and enhanced environmental amenities-which the poorest people of the world cannot afford to emphasize at the expense of the availability of food and the ability to pay for it. This change, too, is a reflection of a fundamental design flaw in the system: that its priorities are determined by donors-moreover, not by representatives of the science agencies of the donors-and that these priorities do not always accord with the fundamental purpose of the system.
It is time to rethink international approaches to agricultural R&D, because of both the changes that have taken place within the CG and the changing context in which it will have to operate. As noted in Chapter 2, rich-country NARSs are changing how they do business in ways that will have important implications for the technologies available to poorer countries. Poor-country NARSs will have to change what they do accordingly, and, clearly, so will the IARCs. The potential role of international cooperative ventures such as the CGIAR is likely to be even greater than in the past, but this change is coming at a time when the CG is losing ground.
To reenergize the CGIAR may require reengineering it. Such change could encompass a narrower constitution of the system, a different set of mandates, and different modes of operation, but it would retain the concept of multinational collective action-including charitable support from the richer countries-to provide agricultural R&D for poor countries. It is important to define clearly the limits of the role of the CGIAR and to understand the links between the CG and other institutions. Universities and other public elements of national agricultural research systems-and, perhaps, increasingly, private for-profit and private nonprofit enterprises such as the Danforth Plant Science Center or CAMBIA-can also play a greater role in light of changes in the science base for agriculture and intellectual property regimes.
The appendix to this chapter starts on page 350. CGIAR  IPGRI  ICARDA  IFPRI  ISNAR  ICLARM  ICRAF  IWMI  CIFOR a million, but a billion-people may be dying of hunger." These views were not confined to the popular press. The eminent ecologist Paul Ehrlich, in The Population Bomb (1968, p. xi) , predicted that in the 1970s, "the world will undergo famines-hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now. At this late date nothing can prevent a substantial increase in the world death rate." 17. Those who advocate this role for research seem unaware of the long lags (typically decades) between committing funds to R&D and realizing a sizable share of the benefits from that commitment.
Appendix
18. In this context, Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) argued for an inclusive concept of economic efficiency that refers to the achievement of the greatest net benefits for the society as a whole, taking a broad view of net benefits that encompasses nonmarket aspects of impacts (for example, on the environment), along with benefits revealed in market transactions.
19. Notably, almost all of the LDC representatives to the CG (mainly from members who joined during the 1990s) come from national food and agriculture agencies, not foreign-affairs or aid ministries.
20. Among the 11 sponsors that pledged their financial support to the CGIAR at the time of the group's second meeting in December 1971 (Baum 1986, p. 64) , the four leading contributors were the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, the United States, and the World Bank.
21. By way of comparison, Monsanto Corporation, a U.S. agricultural products company with $4.94 billion in sales in fiscal year 2003, has nine board members.
22. In January 2001, TAC was replaced with an interim Science Council, which became fully formed in September 2003. The mission of the new Science Council is "to enhance and promote the quality, relevance and impact of science in the CGIAR, to advise the Group on strategic scientific issues of importance to its goals and to mobilize and harness the best of international science for addressing the goals of the international agricultural research community" (CGIAR Science Council 2005b).
23. Nor has the system developed a set of science indicators similar to those reported biannually by the U.S. National Science Foundation or on a regular basis by the OECD's Directorate for Science Technology and Industry.
24. The relevant reports are CGIAR 1977 and 1981 , and CGIAR System Review Secretariat 1998 . 25. Anderson, Herdt, and Scobie (1988 list the documents produced by the CGIAR impact study, and list other such CG studies.
26. These reports were released in 1973 , 1976 , 1992 . 27. Fuglie and Ruttan (1989 provide a mid-1980s estimate of about $200,000 per review, of which center staff time in preparing for the review accounts for 40 percent. A more contemporary estimate by Özgediz (1995) suggests the direct costs of a center review to be more like $300,000, to which must be added the considerable indirect costs of center staff time involved in preparing for the review. These indirect costs are hard to determine but may be around 75 percent of the estimated direct costs.
28. Most center directors now seem to spend much more (often an overwhelmingly large proportion) of their time in fund-raising activities rather than in managing the science being conducted in their centers.
29. The CG has used a number of classification schemes to report its research effort over time. Because centers have largely been left to themselves to decide what constitutes "productivity" or " biodiversity-saving" research, and so on, it is difficult to interpret the reported composition of CG research.
